In the traditional index coding problem, a server employs coding to send messages to n clients within the same broadcast domain. Each client already has some messages as side information and requests a particular unknown message from the server. All clients learn the coding matrix so that they can decode and retrieve their requested data. Our starting observation is that, learning the coding matrix can pose privacy concerns: it may enable a client to infer information about the requests and side information of other clients. In this paper, we mitigate this privacy concern by allowing each client to have limited access to the coding matrix. In particular, we design coding matrices so that each client needs only to learn some of (and not all) the rows to decode her requested message. By means of two different privacy metrics, we first show that this approach indeed increases the level of privacy. Based on this, we propose the use of k-limited-access schemes: given an index coding scheme that employs T transmissions, we create a k-limited-access scheme with T k ≥ T transmissions, and with the property that each client needs at most k transmissions to decode her message. We derive upper and lower bounds on T k for all values of k, and develop deterministic designs for these schemes, which are universal, i.e., independent of the coding matrix. We show that our schemes are order-optimal when either k or n is large. Moreover, we propose heuristics that complement the universal schemes for the case when both n and k are small.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well recognized that broadcasting can offer significant bandwidth savings compared to point-to-point communication [1] , [2] , and could be leveraged in several wireless network applications. Use cases include Wi-Fi (cellular) networks where an access point (a base station) is connected to a set of Wi-Fi (cellular) devices through a wireless broadcast channel, and where devices request messages, such as YouTube videos. Another use case has recently emerged in the context of distributed computing [3] , [4] , where worker nodes exchange data among themselves to complete computational tasks.
A canonical setup which captures the essence of broadcast channels is the index coding framework [5] . In an index coding instance, a server is connected to a set of clients through a noiseless broadcast channel. The server has a database that contains a set of messages. Each client: 1) possesses a subset of the messages that she already knows, which is referred to as the side information set, and 2) requests a message from the database which is not in her side information set. The server has full knowledge of the requests and side information sets of all clients. A linear index code (or index code in short) 1 is a linear coding scheme that comprises a set of coded broadcast transmissions which allow each client to decode her requested message using her side information set. The goal is to find an index code which uses the smallest possible number of broadcast transmissions. The key ingredient in designing efficient (i.e., with a small number of transmissions) index codes is the use of coding across messages.
The starting observation of this work is that, using coding over broadcast channels can cause privacy risks. In particular, a curious client may infer information about the requests and side information sets of other clients, which can be deemed sensitive by their owners. For example, consider a set of clients that use a server to download YouTube videos. Although YouTube videos are publicly available, a client requesting a video about a medical condition may not wish for others to learn her request, or learn what are other videos that she has already downloaded.
To illustrate why coding can create privacy leakage, consider the index coding instance shown in Figure 1 . A server possesses a set of 5 messages, which we refer to as b 1 to b 5 . The server is Server Figure 1 . An index coding example with 5 messages and 4 clients. Each client wants one message and has another as shown above. The optimal index code consists of sending the two transmissions b1 + b2 and b3 + b4.
connected to a set of 4 clients: client 1 wants message b 1 and has as side information message The solution that we propose to limit this privacy leakage stems from the following observation: it may not be necessary to provide clients with the entire set of broadcast transmissions.
Instead, each client can be given access, and learn the coding operations, for only a subset of the transmissions, i.e., the subset that would allow her to decode the message that she requested.
Consider again the example in Figure 1 . The optimal index code consists of two transmissions.
However, each client is able to decode her request using exactly one of the two transmissions.
Therefore, if each client only learns the coding coefficients for the transmission that she needs, then she will have no knowledge of the content of the other transmission, and thus would have less information about the requests of the other clients. Limiting the access of each client to just one out of the two transmissions was possible for this particular example; however, it is not the case that every index code has this property.
Our approach in this paper builds on the idea described above. In particular, given an index coding instance that uses T transmissions, we ask: Can we limit the access of each client to at most k ≤ T transmissions, while still allowing each client to decode her requested message?
In other words, for a given index coding instance, what is the best (in terms of number of transmissions) index code that we can design such that each client is able to decode her request using at most k out of these transmissions? Our work attempts to understand the fundamental relation between limiting the accessibility of clients to the coding matrix and the attained level of privacy. In particular, we propose the use of k-limited-access schemes, that transform the coding matrix so as to restrict each client to access at most k rows of the transformed matrix, as opposed to the whole of it. Our contributions include:
• We formalize the intuition that using k-limited-access-schemes can indeed increase the attained level of privacy against curious clients. We demonstrate this using two privacy metrics, namely an entropy-based metric and the maximal information leakage. In both cases, we show that the attained level of privacy is linearly dependent on the value of k, i.e., privacy increases linearly with the number of rows of the coding matrix that we hide.
• We design polynomial time (in the number of clients) universal k-limited-access schemes (i.e., that do not depend on the structure of the coding matrix), and require a simple matrix multiplication. We prove that these schemes are order-optimal in some regimes, in particular when either k or n (the number of clients) is large. Interestingly, when k is larger than a threshold, these schemes enable to restrict the amount of access to half of the coding matrix with an overhead of exactly one additional transmission. This result indicates that some privacy-bandwidth trade-off points can be achieved with minimal overhead.
• We propose algorithms that depend on the structure of the coding matrix and show that, when n and k are both small, they provide improved performance with respect to the universal schemes mentioned above. These schemes use a graph-theory representation of the problem, and are optimal for some special instances.
• We provide analytical and numerical performance evaluations of our schemes. We show how our proposed k-limited-access schemes provide a bandwidth-privacy trade-off, namely how much bandwidth usage (i.e., number of transmissions) is needed to achieve a certain level of privacy (captured by the value of k). We show that our proposed schemes provide a trade-off curve that is close to the lower bound when either k or n is large. In the case where both n and k are small, we show through numerical evaluations that our proposed algorithms give an average performance that is close to the lower bound.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our notation, formulates the problem, and gives a geometric interpretation. Section III discusses how k-limited-access schemes limit the privacy leakage. Section IV shows the construction of k-limited-access schemes and proves their order-optimality when either n or k is large. Section V designs algorithms which are bettersuited for cases when both n and k are small. Section VI discusses related work and Section VII concludes the paper. Some of the proofs are delegated to the appendices.
II. NOTATION, PROBLEM FORMULATION AND GEOMETRIC INTERPRETATION
Notation. Calligraphic letters indicate sets; |X | is the cardinality of X ; [n] is the set of integers {1, · · · , n}; boldface lower case letters denote vectors and boldface upper case letters indicate matrices; given a vector b, b i indicates the i-th element of b; given matrices A and B, B ⊂ k A indicates that B is formed by a set of k rows of A; 0 j is the all-zero row vector of dimension j; 1 j denotes a row vector of dimension j of all ones and I j is the identity matrix of dimension j; e j i is the all-zero row vector of length j with a 1 in position i; for all x ∈ R, the floor and ceiling functions are denoted with x and x , respectively; logarithms are in base 2; Pr(X) refers to the probability of event X. Index Coding. We consider an index coding instance, where a server has a database B of m messages B = {b M }, where M = [m] is the set of message indices, and b j ∈ F F 2 , j ∈ M, with F being the message size, and where operations are done over the binary field. The server is connected through a broadcast channel to a set of clients C = {c N }, where N = [n] is the set of client indices. We assume that m ≥ n. Each client c i , i ∈ N , has a subset of the messages {b S i }, with S i ⊂ M, as side information and requests a new message b q i with q i ∈ M \ S i that she does not have. We assume that the server employs a linear code, i.e., it designs a set of broadcast transmissions that are linear combinations of the messages in B. Problem Formulation. In [5] , it was shown that the index coding problem is equivalent to the rank minimization of an n × m matrix G ∈ F n×m 2 , whose i-th row g i , i ∈ [n], has the following properties: (i) has a 1 in the position q i (i.e., the index of the message requested by client c i ),
(ii) has a 0 in the j-th position for all j ∈ M \ S i , (iii) can have either 0 or 1 in all the remaining positions. For instance, with reference to the example in Figure 1 , we would have
where can be either 0 or 1. It was shown in [5] that finding an optimal linear coding scheme i.e., with minimum number of transmissions) is equivalent to completing G (i.e., assign values to the components of G) so that it has the minimum possible rank. Once we have completed G, we can use a basis of the row space of G (of size T = rank (G)) as a coding matrix A. In this case, client c i can construct g i as a linear combination of the rows of A, i.e., c i performs , we can create a corresponding G in polynomial time).
In our problem formulation we assume that we start with a given matrix G of rank T , i.e., we are given n distinct vectors that belong to a T -dimensional subspace. Using a basis of the row space of the given G, we construct A ∈ F T ×m 2
. Then, we ask: Given n distinct vectors g i , i ∈ [n], in a T -dimensional space, can we find a minimum-size set A k with T k ≥ T vectors, such that each g i can be expressed as a linear combination of at most k vectors in A k (with
The vectors in A k form the rows of the coding matrix A k that we will employ.
Then by definition, client c i will be able to reconstruct g i using the matrix A (i) k ⊂ k A k . We can equivalently restate the question as follows: Given a coding matrix A, can we find P ∈ F T k ×T 2 , with T k as small as possible, such that A k = PA and each row of G can be reconstructed by combining at most k rows of A k ? Note that k = T corresponds to the conventional transmission scheme of an index coding problem for which P = I T . In the remainder of the paper we will refer to a scheme that chooses A k to be the coding matrix as k-limited-access scheme.
Transmission Protocol. In order to realize the privacy benefits of using k-limited-access schemes -which we will thoroughly illustrate in Section III -we propose a different transmission protocol for the index coding setup. Figure 2 shows both the conventional and the proposed transmission protocols. In the conventional protocol, the server designs a set of T packets, each corresponding to an equation from the set of equations AB = Y. As shown in Figure 2 consists of (i) a payload which contains the linear combination y i and (ii) a header which contains the coefficients a i used to create the equation. In the conventional protocol, the server sends these packets (both headers and payloads) on the broadcast channel to all clients. Our Figure 3 . A geometric interpretation of k-limited-access schemes. An index code A is obtained from a particular filling of the matrix G. Therefore, the collection of row vectors of G lies in the span of A. Finding A k is equivalent to finding a collection of subspaces, each of dimension at most k, to cover G. Client ci is sent a collection of (at most) k rows of A k ; these correspond to one subspace which covers gi.
proposed protocol, however, operates differently. Specifically, the server generates packets which correspond to the set of equations A k B = Y k in a way that is similar to the conventional protocol. The server then sends only the payloads of these packets on the broadcast channel.
Differently, the server sends the coefficients corresponding to only A (i) k ⊂ k A k to client c i using a private key or on a dedicated private channel (e.g., the same channel used by c i to convey her request to the server). Thus, using a k-limited-access scheme incurs an extra transmission overhead to privately convey the coding vectors. In particular, the total number of transmitted bits C k can be upper bounded as C k ≤ nkm + T k F, while the total number of transmitted bits C using a conventional scheme is C = T (F + m). The extra overhead incurred is negligible in comparison to the broadcast transmissions that convey the encoded messages when n and m are both o(F ), which is a reasonable assumption for large file sizes (for instance, when sharing
YouTube videos).
Geometric Interpretation. The geometric interpretation of our problem is depicted in Figure 3 .
An index code A corresponds to a particular completion of the matrix G. Therefore, the set of row vectors in G lies in the row span of A (which is of dimension T ). We denote this subspace of dimension T by L. The problem of finding a matrix A k can be interpreted as finding a set of subspaces, each of dimension at most k, such that each row vector g i , i ∈ [n], is covered by at least one of these smaller subspaces. Once these subspaces are selected, then the rows of A k are taken as the union of the basis vectors of all these subspaces. Client c i is then given the basis vectors of subspace L i , i.e., the one which covers g i , instead of the whole matrix A k .
Therefore c i would have perfect knowledge of L i instead of L. Having less information about L naturally translates to less information about the requests of other clients, as we more formally discuss in the next section.
III. ACHIEVED PRIVACY LEVELS
In this section, we investigate and quantify the level of privacy that k-limited-access schemes can achieve compared to a conventional index coding scheme (i.e., when each client has access to the entire coding matrix). In what follows, we consider the setup described in the previous section and suppose that client c n is curious, i.e., by leveraging the (at most) k rows A (n) k that she receives, she seeks to infer information about client c i , i ∈ [n − 1]. Specifically, we are interested in quantifying the amount of information that c n can obtain about q i (i.e., the identity of the request of c i ) as a function of k.
We assume that the index coding instance is random, i.e., we consider the requests and side information sets of clients as random variables and denote them as Q [n] and S [n] , respectively.
The operation of the server is shown in Figure 4 and is described as follows:
Step-1: The server obtains the information about the requests Q [n] and side information sets S [n] of all clients c [n] .
Step-2: Based on this information, the server designs an index code A by means of some index coding algorithm [6] - [8] .
Step-3: The server then applies the k-limited-access scheme to obtain A k = PA, where P is a deterministic mapping from A to A k (see Section IV for the construction of P). This implies that T k is a deterministic function of T and k (i.e., the parameter of the scheme).
Step-4: The server sends A We are now interested in quantifying the level of privacy that is achieved by the protocol described above. Towards this end, we use two privacy metrics, namely an entropy-based metric and the maximal information leakage.
A. Entropy-Based Privacy Metric
The entropy-based privacy metric is inspired by the geometric interpretation of our problem in Figure 3 . We let L (respectively, L n ) be the random variable associated with the subspace spanned by the T rows of the coding matrix A (respectively, spanned by the k row vectors of
. Client c n receives the matrix Y k and as such she knows T k . Given this, we now define the entropy-based privacy metric and evaluate it for the proposed protocol.
Definition III.1. The entropy-based privacy metric is defined as
and quantifies the amount of uncertainty that c n has about the subspace spanned by the T rows of the index coding matrix A.
, we state the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix A.
Assume an index coding setting with c n observing a particular subspace L n = n and a number of transmissions T k = t k for the k-limited access scheme. Moreover, we consider a stronger adversary (i.e., curious client) and assume that she also knows the specific realization of T = t. Given this, we can compute
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows because T k is a deterministic function of T and k, which is the parameter of the scheme (see Step-3); (ii) the equality in (b) follows by assuming that the underlying system maintains a uniform distribution across all feasible t-dimensional subspaces of F m 2 ; (iii) the equality in (c) follows by virtue of Lemma III.1. We note that when m t, then the quantity in (1) decreases linearly with k, i.e., as intuitively expected, the less rows of the coding matrix c n learns, the less she can infer about the subspace spanned by the T rows of the coding matrix A. This suggests that, by increasing k, c n has less uncertainty about q i . Note
is zero when k = t; this is because, under this condition, c n receives the entire index coding matrix, i.e., L n = L, and hence she is able to perfectly reconstruct the subspace spanned by its rows. However, although P (Ent) k = 0 when k = t, c n might still have uncertainty about q i [9] . Quantifying this uncertainty is an interesting open problem; this uncertainty, in fact, depends on the underlying system, e.g., on the index code used by the server and on the distribution with which the index code matrix is selected.
B. Maximal Information Leakage
The second metric that we consider as our privacy metric is the Maximal Information Leakage (MIL) [10] . Given two discrete random variables X and Y with alphabets X and Y, the MIL from X to Y is denoted by L(X → Y ) and defined as
where the second equality is shown in [10] . The MIL metric captures the amount of information leaked about X through Y to an adversary, who is interested in estimating a (possibly probabilistic) function S of X. This is captured by the fact that S − X − Y forms a Markov chain as shown in the expression in (2) . The metric considers a worst-case such adversary, that is, an adversary who is interested in computing a function S for which the maximum information can be leaked out of Y . The result in [10] shows that this quantity depends only on the joint distribution of X and Y . The following properties of the MIL are useful [10] :
To describe how we use the MIL as a privacy metric in our setup, we first need to define what are the corresponding random variables X and Y , and then argue that the estimation of client c n of the requests of other clients forms a Markov chain as required by the MIL definition. To do so, we first define the following sets:
1) Given g i , A k and an integer r, let P(g i , A k , r) be the set of all possible sub-matrices A (i) k of A k with exactly r rows, that client c i can use to reconstruct the vector g i :
k of A k with the minimum possible number of rows, such that client c i with side information S i can decode q i :
Since the requests and the side information sets are considered as random variables, then all subsequently generated codes, namely A, A k and A (i) k can be treated as random variables as well. We denote the corresponding random variables of these quantities as A, A k and A (i) k respectively. In other words, for a given realization of
, the corresponding realizations of the aforementioned codes used by the server are A = A, A k = A k and A
When using conventional index codes (i.e., without k-limited-access schemes), client c n (i.e., the curious client and hence the adversary) would try to infer information about Q [n−1] from observing A and given her information of Q n , S n . Therefore, one can think of client c n estimate of Q [n−1] as being a particular estimation function, the input of which is A. Differently, after using k-limited-access schemes, client c n would only have observed A 
conditioned on the knowledge of Q n , S n in every stage of the chain.
Proof: We have the following:
Step-3 of the proposed protocol);
Step-4 of the proposed protocol.
k |Q n = q n , S n = S n as our MIL privacy metric 2 . The quantity
gives the maximum amount of information that c n can extract about Q [n−1] given the knowledge of Q n , S n . The following theorem -proved in Appendix B -provides a guarantee
Theorem III.3. Using the MIL, the attained level of privacy against a curious client when k-limited-access schemes are used is
The quantity in (4) characterizes the maximum amount of information that can be leaked to a curious client when k-limited-access schemes are used. It is clear that decreasing k would decrease this amount of information; this aligns with the intuition that the less rows a server gives to a client, the less information a client would be able to infer about other clients sharing the broadcast domain. In order to shed more light on the benefits of using k-limited-access schemes, one could compare the quantity P (MIL) k with the MIL obtained when k-limited-access schemes are not used, i.e., when a client observes the whole matrix A. Let this quantity be denoted asP
Then we have the following result, which is proved in Appendix C.
Theorem III.4. Using the MIL, the attained level of privacy against a curious client for a conventional index coding setup isP
The results in Theorem III.3 and Theorem III.4 can be interpreted with the help of Figure 5 .
The k-limited-access schemes achieve privacy gains as compared to conventional index codes, when the two bounds in (4) and (5) strictly mismatch. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this is to select k = o(T ).
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF k-LIMITED-ACCESS SCHEMES
In this section, we focus on designing k-limited-access schemes and assessing their theoretical performance in terms of number of additional transmissions required with respect to a conventional index coding scheme. Recall that we are given a coding matrix A that requires T transmissions. Then, we seek to construct a matrix P ∈ F
, so that A k = PA, and each client needs to access at most k rows of A k to decode her requested message. In particular, we aim at constructing matrices P with T k as small as possible. Trivially, T k ≥ T . Towards this end, we first derive upper and lower bounds on T k . Our main result is stated in the theorem below.
Theorem IV.1. Given an index coding matrix A ∈ F T ×m 2 with T ≥ 2, it is possible to transform
, such that each client can decode her requested message by combining at most k rows of A k , if and only if
Moreover, we provide polynomial time (in n) constructions of P such that:
• When 1 ≤ k < T /2 , then
Proof: The lower bound on T k in (6) is proved in Appendix D. In particular, the bound in (6) says that, if we are allowed to combine at most k out of the T k vectors, then we should be able to create a sufficient number of vectors. The two upper bounds on T k in (7) and (8) are proved in Section IV-A, where we give explicit constructions for P.
We note that, as expected, the smaller the value of k that we require, the larger the value of T k that we need to use. Trivially, for k = 1 we would need T k = n, i.e., the server would need to send uncoded transmissions. Thus, there is a trade-off between the bandwidth -measured as the number T k of broadcast transmissions -and privacy -captured by the value of k that we require. Interestingly, when k ≥ T /2 , with just one extra transmission, i.e., T k = T + 1, we can restrict the access of each client to at most half of the coding matrix, independently of the coding matrix A. In other words, for this regime, we can achieve a certain level of privacy with minimal overhead. However, as we further reduce the value of k, the overhead becomes more significant. Moreover, the results in Theorem IV.1 also imply that our constructions are orderoptimal in the case of large values of n (when n = Θ(2 T )) 3 . In addition, when T /2 ≤ k < T , our scheme is at most one transmission away from the optimal number of transmissions, and this is for any value of n. This is shown in the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix D.
Lemma IV.2. Consider an index coding setup. We have
• When n = 2 T − 1 and T /2 ≤ k < T , the bounds in (6) and (7) coincide, i.e., the provided construction of P is optimal;
• For any value of n < 2 T − 1 and T /2 ≤ k < T , the bound in (7) is at most one transmission away from the bound in (6);
• When n = Θ(2 T ) and for any value of k, then T k = Θ(k2 T k ), i.e., the provided construction is order-optimal. Figure 6 shows the trade-off exhibited by our proposed k-limited-access schemes between bandwidth usage (T k ) and the attained privacy (k) -we use k as a proxy to the amount of attained privacy against a curious client (see Section III). The figure shows the performance of our constructions in Theorem IV.1 (labeled as Scheme-1), as well as the lower bound in (6) (labeled as LB) and an upper bound which corresponds to uncoded transmissions (labeled as UB). Figure 6 (a) confirms the order-optimality of our constructions when n = 2 T −1. In addition, 3 Note that n is always O(2 T ) (i.e., the number of distinct vectors gi for a given T is at most 2 T − 1). The case of large values of n corresponds to the case where this bound on the number of distinct vectors gi is not loose: there is a corresponding lower bound on n, i.e., n = Ω(2 T ). Therefore, the case of large values of n corresponds to n = Θ(2 T ). our schemes perform similarly well when n is sufficiently large (and not necessarily equal to
as shown in Figure 6 (b) where n = T 4 . Finally, Figure 6 (c) shows the performance for a small value of n (n = T 2 ). The figure shows that our proposed constructions do not perform as well when n and k are small, a case which we study in more details in Section V.
We now conclude this section by giving explicit constructions of the P matrix and prove the two upper bounds on T k in (7) and (8) . Our design of P allows to reconstruct any of the 2 T vectors of size T . As such our constructions are universal, in the sense that the matrix P that we construct does not depend on the specific index coding matrix A.
A. Proof of Theorem IV.1, Equations (7) and (8) Recall that A is full rank and that the i-th row of G can be expressed as
2 is the coefficients row vector associated with g i . We next analyze two different cases/regimes, which depend on the value of k.
which results in a matrix A k with T k = T + 1, matching the bound in (7) . We now show that When n < T + 1, then it is sufficient to send n uncoded transmissions, where the i-th transmission satisfies c i , i ∈ [n]. In this case c i has access only to the i-th transmission, i.e., k = 1. This completes the proof of the upper bound in (7).
Example: We show how the scheme works via a small example, where T = 4 and k = 2. In this case, we have Case II:
. Then, we can write
where, for i ∈ [Q], the matrix Z i , of dimension λ i × T , is constructed as follows
, has as rows all non-zero vectors of length T k . Therefore,
Similarly, the matrix Z Q+1 , of dimension λ Q+1 × T , is constructed as follows
whereZ Q+1 , of dimension λ Q+1 ×T rem , has as rows all non-zero vectors of length T rem . Therefore,
In other words, the matrix P is constructed as a block-diagonal matrix, with the diagonal elements beingZ i for all i ∈ [Q + 1]. Therefore, equation (8) holds by computing
What remains is to show that any vector g i , i ∈ [n], can be reconstructed by adding at most k vectors of P. To show this, we prove that any vector v ∈ F Example: We show how the scheme works via a small example, where T = 8 and k = 3.
For this particular example, we have Q = T / T k = 2 and T rem = T − Q T k = 2. Thus, the idea is that, to reconstruct a vector v ∈ F 8 2 , we treat v as k = 3 disjoint parts; the first 2 are of length T k = 3 and the remaining part is of length T rem = 2. We then construct P as k = 3 disjoint sections, where each section allows us to reconstruct one part of the vector. Specifically, we construct 
Any vector v can be reconstructed by picking at most k vectors out of P, one from each section. 
V. CONSTRUCTIONS FOR SMALL VALUES OF n AND k
In Section IV, we have proved that, independently of the value of n, if k ≥ T /2 , then it is sufficient to add one additional transmission to the T transmissions of the conventional index coding scheme. Moreover, the analysis provided in Lemma IV.2 showed the order-optimality of our universal scheme in Theorem IV.1 (referred to as Scheme-1) for values of k < T /2 when n is large (i.e., exponential in T ). Figure 7 shows the performance of Scheme-1 in Theorem IV.1 as a function of the values of n for T = 20, with k = 2 in Figure 7 (a) and k = 5 in Figure 7 (b). The performance of Scheme-1 was obtained by averaging over 1000 random index coding instances.
In each instance, a code is constructed using the scheme described in Section IV-A, and only the rows actually used by the clients c [n] are retained. The performance of the scheme is finally computed by the average number of rows retained in those 1000 iterations. Figure 7 shows that our proposed scheme performs well not only for the case of large n (i.e., n = 2 T −1) but also for lower values of n. However, Figure 7 also suggests that for small values of both n and k (note the left-half of the plot in Figure 7 (a)), we need to devise schemes that better adapt to the specific values of the index coding matrix A and vectors g i , i ∈ [n] (recall that Scheme-1 is universal, and hence independent of the value of A). We next propose and analyze the performance of such algorithms.
A. Special Instances
We first represent the problem through a bipartite graph as follows. We assume that the rank of the matrix G is T . Then, there exists a set of T linearly independent vectors in G; without loss of generality, we denote them as g 1 to g T . Therefore, each vector g i+T , i ∈ [n − T ], can be expressed as a linear combination of some/all vectors from g [T ] ; we denote these vectors as the component vectors of g i+T . We can then represent the problem as a bipartite graph (U ∪ V, E)
with |U| = T and |V| = n − T , where u i ∈ U represents the vector g i for i ∈ [T ], v j ∈ V represents the vector g j+T for j ∈ [n − T ], and an edge exists from node u i to node v j if g i is one of the component vectors of g j+T . Figure 8 shows an example of such graph, where n = 9
and T = 6. For instance, v 1 (i.e., g 7 ) can be reconstructed by adding
Given a node s in the graph, we refer to the sets O s and I s as the outbound and inbound sets of s, respectively: the inbound set contains the nodes which have edges outgoing to node s, and the outbound set contains the nodes to which node s has outgoing edges (i.e., the nodes each of which has an incoming edge from s). Nodes on either sides of the bipartite graph have either inbound or outbound sets. For instance, with reference to Figure 8 , O u 1 = {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 } and
For this particular example, there exists a scheme with T 2 = 6 which can reconstruct any vector with at most k = 2 additions. The matrix A 2 which corresponds to this solution consists of the following vectors: For the example in Figure 9 , we created branches on two ordered sets, S 1 = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 } and S 2 = {u 5 , u 6 }. Once the branch is added, we can change the connections of the nodes in V in accordance to the added vectors. For the example in Figure 9 , we can replace u [4] in I v 1 with only s 3 . Using this representation, we have the following lemma.
, then this instance can be solved by exactly T transmissions for any k ≥ 2.
Proof: One solution of such instance would involve creating a branch on the set S =
The scheme used would have the matrix A 2 with its t-th row
If we let t be the maximum index for which v j−T ∈ O u i t , then we have I v j−T = {u i 1 , · · · , u it }, and so we get
This completes the proof.
of rank T , if n = T + 1, then this instance can be solved in T transmissions for any k ≥ 2.
Proof: Without loss of generality, let g [T ] be a set of linearly independent vectors of G. Then,
instance can be solved in T transmissions. This completes the proof.
B. Algorithms for General Instances
We here propose two different algorithms, namely Successive Circuit Removing (SCR) and
Branch-Search, and analyze their performance.
Algorithm 1: Successive Circuit Removing (SCR). Our first proposed algorithm is based on
Corollary V.2, which can be interpreted as follows: any matrix G of r + 1 row vectors and rank r can be reconstructed by a corresponding A 2 matrix with r rows. If there does not exist any subset of rows of G with rank less than r, we call G a circuit 4 . Our algorithm works for the case k = 2 q , for some integer q. We first describe SCR for the case where q = 1, and then extend it to general values of q. The algorithm works as follows:
1) Circuit Finding: find a set of vectors of G that form a circuit of small size. Denote the size of this circuit as r + 1.
2) Matrix Update: apply Corollary V.2 to find a set of r vectors that can optimally reconstruct the circuit by adding at most k = 2 of them, and add this set to A 2 .
3) Circuit Removing: update G by removing the circuit. Repeat the first two steps until the matrix G is of size T × T and of rank T , where T ≤ T . Then, add these vectors to A 2 .
Once SCR is executed, the output is a matrix A 2 such that any vector in G can be reconstructed by adding at most k = 2 vectors of A 2 . Consider now the case where q = 2 (i.e., k = 4) for example. In this case, a second application of SCR on the matrix A 2 would yield another matrix, denoted as A 4 , such that any row in A 2 can be reconstructed by adding at most 2 vectors of A 4 . Therefore, any vector in G can now be reconstructed by adding at most 4 vectors of A 4 .
We can therefore extrapolate this idea for a general q by successively applying SCR q times on G to obtain A k , with k = 2 q .
The following theorem gives a closed form characterization of the best and worst case performance of SCR.
be the number of vectors in A k obtained via SCR. Then, for k = 2 q and integer q, we have
where f Best (n) = 2
Proof: First we focus on the case q = 1. The lower bound in (10) corresponds to the best case when the matrix G can be partitioned into disjoint circuits of size 3. In this case, if SCR finds one such circuit in each iteration, then each circuit is replaced with 2 vectors in A 2 according to Corollary V.2. To obtain the upper bound, note that any collection of T + 1 has at most T independent vectors, and therefore contains a circuit of at most size T + 1. Therefore, the upper bound corresponds to the case where the matrix G can be partitioned into circuits of size T + 1 and an extra T linearly independent vectors. In that case, the algorithm can go through each of these circuits, adding T vectors to A 2 for each of these circuits, and then add the last T vectors in the last step of the algorithm. Finally, the bounds in (10) for a general q can be proven by a successive repetition of the above arguments.
Algorithm 2: Branch-Search. A naive approach to determining the optimal matrix A k is to consider the whole space F T 2 , loop over all possible subsets of vectors of F T 2 and, for every subset, check if it can be used as a matrix A k . The minimum-size subset which can be used as A k is indeed the optimal matrix. However, such algorithm requires in the worst case O 2 2 T number of operations, which makes it prohibitively slow even for very small values of T . Instead, the heuristic that we here propose finds a matrix A k more efficiently than the naive search scheme.
The main idea behind the heuristic is based on providing a subset R ⊂ F T 2 which is much smaller than 2 T and is guaranteed to have at least one solution. The heuristic then searches for a matrix A k by looping over all possible subsets of R. Our heuristic therefore consists of two sub-algorithms, namely Branch and Search. Branch takes as input G, and produces as output a set of vectors R which contains at least one solution A k . The algorithm works as follows:
1) Find a set of T vectors of G that are linearly independent. Denote this set as B.
2) Create a bipartite graph representation of G as discussed in Section V-A, using B as the independent vectors for U.
3) Pick the dependent node v i with the highest degree, and split ties arbitrarily. Denote by deg(v i ) the degree of node v i .
4)
Consider the inbound set I v i , and sort its elements in a descending order according to their degrees. Without loss of generality, assume that this set of ordered independent nodes is
5) Create a branch on I v i . Denote the new branch nodes as {u
6) Update the connections of all dependent nodes in accordance with the constructed branch. This is done as follows: for each node v j ∈ V with deg(v j ) ≥ k, if I v j ∩ I v i is of the form The output R is the set of vectors corresponding to all nodes in the graph. The next theorem shows that R in fact contains one possible A k , and characterizes the performance of Branch.
Theorem V.4. For a matrix G of dimension n × T , (a) Branch produces a set R which contains at least one possible A k , (b) the worst-case time complexity t Branch of Branch is O(n 2 ), and (c)
Proof: To see (a), note that the algorithm terminates when all dependent nodes have a degree of k or less. In every iteration of the algorithm, the degrees of all dependent nodes either remain the same or are reduced. In addition, at least one dependent node is updated and its degree is reduced to 1. Therefore the algorithm is guaranteed to terminate. Since all dependent nodes have degrees k or less, their corresponding vectors can be reconstructed by at most k vectors in R.
Therefore, R contains at least one solution A k .
To prove (b), the worst-case runtime of Branch corresponds to going over all nodes in V, creating a branch for each one. For the i-th node considered by Branch, the algorithm would update the dependencies of all dependent nodes with degrees greater than k, which are at most
To prove (c), note that |R| is equal to the total number of nodes in all branches created by the algorithm. Therefore we can write |R| ≤
Let t Search be the worst-time complexity of the Search step in Branch-Search. Then the worstcase time complexity of Branch-Search is equal to
, which is exponentially better than the complexity of the naive search.
Although our heuristic is still of exponential runtime complexity, we observe from numerical simulations that |R| is usually much less than (n−T )T . Finding more efficient ways of searching through the set R to find a solution A k is an open question.
C. Numerical Evaluation
We here explore the performance of our proposed schemes through numerical evaluations.
Specifically, we assess the performance in terms of T k of SCR and Branch-Search (labeled as BS). We compare their performance against the lower bound in equation (6) (labeled as LB), and the upper bound of sending uncoded transmissions (labeled as UB). In particular, we are interested in regimes for which k < T /2 , because otherwise we know from Theorem IV.1 that
Moreover, we consider values of n < 2 T − 1, because if n = 2 T − 1 we know from Lemma IV.2 that Scheme-1 is order optimal. For SCR, we evaluate its average performance (averaged over 1000 iterations) as well as its upper and lower bounds performance established in Theorem V.3. For Branch-Search, we evaluate its average performance (averaged over 1000
iterations). Figure 10 shows the performance of all the aforementioned schemes for T = 6 and k = 2. As can be seen from Figure 10 , SCR consistently performs better than uncoded transmissions. In addition, although the current implementation of SCR greedily searches for a small circuit to remove, more sophisticated algorithms for small circuit finding could potentially improve its performance. However, the bounds in (10) suggest that the performance of SCR is asymptotically O(n). Branch-Search appears to perform better than other schemes in the average sense. Understanding its asymptotic behavior in the worst-case is an interesting open problem.
VI. RELATED WORK
Index coding was introduced in [5] , where the problem was proven to be NP-hard. Given this, several works have aimed at providing approximate algorithms for the index coding problem [6] , [8] , [12] . In our work, we were interested in studying the index coding problem from the perspective of private information delivery.
The problem of protecting privacy was initially proposed to enable the disclosure of databases for public access, while maintaining the anonymity of the clients [13] . Similar concerns have been raised in the context of Private Information Retrieval (PIR), which was introduced in [14] and has received a fair amount of attention [15] - [19] . In particular, in PIR the goal is to ensure that no information about the identity of clients' requests is revealed to a set of malicious databases when clients are trying to retrieve information from them. Similarly, the problem of
Oblivious Transfer was studied [20] , [21] to establish, by means of cryptographic techniques, two-way private connections between the clients and the server. We note that it is not clear how the use of cryptographic approaches would help in our setup. A curious client, in fact, obtains information about other clients once she learns the transmitted combinations of the messages,
i.e., the coding operations. In other words, given that a curious client has also requested data, she needs to learn how the transmitted messages are coded, in order to be able to decode her own requested message.
We were here interested in addressing privacy concerns in broadcast domains. In particular,
we analyzed this problem within the index coding framework, as we recently proposed in [9] .
This problem differs from secure index coding [22] , [23] , where the goal is to guarantee that an external eavesdropper (with her own side information set) in [22] , and each client in [23] , does not learn any information about the content of the messages other than her requested message.
Differently, our goal was to limit the information that a client can learn about the identities of the requests of other clients (however, the two approaches could be combined). 1Note that the techniques developed here can fundamentally differ from those designed for secure index coding. As an extreme example, in fact, the server in our setup can trivially send all the messages that it possesses in an uncoded manner on the broadcast channel. In this case, a curious client will be able to decode all messages, but would still not be able to infer which messages were requested/possessed by other clients, and would learn nothing about their side information. This property is what fundamentally contrasts the problem under consideration from the works in [22] , [23] . Moreover, our approach here has a significant difference with respect to [9] . In fact, while in [9] our goal was to design the coding matrix to guarantee a high-level of privacy, here we assumed that an index coding matrix (that satisfies all clients) was given to us and we developed methods to increase its achieved level of privacy.
The use of k-limited-access schemes allows the server to transform an existing index code into a locally decodable index code [24] , [25] . Locally decodable index codes allow each client to decode her request using at most k symbols out of the codeword, where k is referred to as the locality of the code. In [24] , the authors showed that the optimal scalar linear locally decodable index codes with locality 1 are the ones obtained from the coloring of the information graph of the index coding problem. In addition, they provided probabilistic results on the existence (and the impossibility of existence) of locally decodable codes with particular lengths and localities for index coding problems on random graphs. In [25] , the authors extended one result in [24] where they showed that the optimal vector linear locally decodable index codes with locality 1 are obtained from the fractional coloring of the information graph. In addition, they provided a scheme which allows the construction of locally decodable codes for a particular set of index coding instances with special properties, i.e., when certain covering properties are maintained on the side information graph of the index coding problem. Differently from these works, one of the main results of this paper consisted of providing deterministic constructions/schemes which transform any existing index code into an equivalent code with locality k. In addition, our schemes are universal, i.e., they do not depend on the underlying index coding instance.
The solution that we here proposed to limit the privacy leakage is based on finding overcomplete bases. This approach is closely related to compressed sensing and dictionary learning [26] , where the goal is to learn a dictionary of signals such that other signals can be sparsely and accurately represented using atoms from this dictionary. These problems seek lossy solutions, i.e., signal reconstruction is not necessarily perfect. This allows a convex optimization formulation of the problem, which can be solved efficiently [27] . In contrast, our problem was concerned with lossless reconstructions, in which case the optimization problem is no longer convex.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied privacy risks in index coding. This problem is motivated by the observation that, since the coding matrix needs to be available to all clients, then some clients may be able to infer the identity of the request and side information of other clients. We proposed the use of k-limited-access schemes: these schemes transform the coding matrix so that we can restrict each client to access at most k-rows of the transformed matrix as opposed to the whole of it. We explored two privacy metrics, one based on entropy arguments, and the other on the maximal information leakage. Both metrics indicate that the amount of privacy increases with the number of rows that we hide. We then designed polynomial time universal k-limited-access schemes, that do not depend on the structure of the index coding matrix A and proved that they are order-optimal when either k or n is large. For the case where both k and n are small, we proposed algorithms that depend on the structure of the index coding matrix A and provide improved performance. We overall found that there exists an inherent trade-off between privacy and bandwidth (number of broadcast transmissions), and that in some cases we can achieve significant privacy with minimal overhead.
The proof is based on simple counting arguments. A subspace L contains all vectors in L n , the number of which is 2 k . A subspace L therefore consists of a set of T −k linearly independent In addition, we define the following set. Given g i and an integer r, we let D(g i , r) be the set of all possible matrices A (i) k of r rows from which g i can be reconstructed, namely
Note that the definition of D(g i , r) is different than that of P(g i , A k , r) in that it is not dependent on a specific matrix A k . Then, we can write
≤ log A k would belong to D(g n , r) for some r ∈ [k] and some g n ∈ G(Q n , S n ); (iii) the equality in (c) follows by noting that, by symmetry, the number of matrices with r rows from which the vector g i can be reconstructed is the same for every possible vector g i ∈ G(q i , S i ). Therefore, the sum over g n can be replaced by D(g n , r)×|G(q n , S n )| where g n is any arbitrary vector in G(q n , S n ). Based on the structure of the vectors g n ∈ G(q n , S n ), i.e., one in position q n and zeros in the positions [m] \ {q n ∪ S n }, it follows that |G(q n , S n )| = 2 |Sn| ;
(iv) the inequality in (d) is obtained by counting arguments similar to those in the proof of Lemma III.1. In particular, we enumerate the number of ways we can construct a matrix A (n) k with r linearly independent rows, which when linearly combined gives g i . We first pick a row
where Span(X ) of a set of row vectors X is the row span of these vectors; the number of possible vectors v 1 is 2 m − 2. Then, we pick a second row vector . Thus, we have
Combining this with the fact that T k ≥ T gives precisely the bound in (6).
Lemma IV.2. We now derive the lower bound in Lemma IV.2. We first consider the case where n = 2 T − 1. From (11), we obtain
Since in general T k ≥ T , to prove that T k ≥ T + 1 for k < T , it is sufficient to show that we have a contradiction for T k = T . Indeed, by setting T k = T , the bound in (12) becomes
which clearly is not possible since k < T . Hence, T k ≥ T + 1 for all k < T .
For a general n and 1 ≤ k < T /2 , we have
Therefore, T k = Ω(k2 T k ) when n = Θ(2 T ). This lower bound, along with the upper bound in equation (8) concludes the proof of Lemma IV.2.
